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Executive Summary 
Golar LNG is a company engaged in the LNG shipping business. The company fleet has 
grown from 6 vessels in 2001 to today’s fleet of 13 vessels, and a further 13 vessels due to be 
delivered from Q3 2013. The company is currently engaged in acquisition, ownership, 
operations and chartering of LNG carriers, FSRU vessels. It has also recently signed a 
conditional agreement for developing its first FLNG vessels, with the aim of launching three 
converted vessels within mid 2015. 
This thesis has an analytical approach, emphasizing detailed valuation of the individual 
vessels. The valuation is supported by a strategic external analysis (Porter’s five forces 
model), but the cash flow calculations are given the highest focus, and they are also based 
upon some reasoned assumptions not being highlighted in the strategic analysis. 
The estimated share value is evaluated by use of comparative analysis, and is also made 
subject to a sensitivity analysis of the individual model-parameters. 
Golar LNG is trading at higher multiples than its peer group, and the share price is exposed to 
changes in charter rates due to many vessels are not committed to charter contracts. 
The thesis concludes that Golar LNG is currently fairly valued at NASDAQ, albeit the market 
value is 8-10% less than my estimated share value. Given the short term uncertainties 
surrounding carrier charter rates, and the company’s low contract coverage in the carrier 
business segment, a ‘HOLD’ strategy is recommended until some downside risk is removed. 
However, in the long run, it is expected that the stock will be a good investment, even at 
current share price levels. 
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1 Introduction. 
1.1 Choice of Topic 
The calculated valuation of an asset depends on the future estimated cash flow generated by 
the asset within an anticipated period of operations. Theoretically, the cash flow can be 
derived from an infinite future, thus causing any estimate to contain large elements of 
uncertainty. Any valuation will be flawed by forecasting errors, and no method for valuation 
will be better than the accuracy of the assumptions and the projections forming basis for the 
valuation. The accuracy of cash flow projections however, tend to vary quite a bit between 
asset classes, and also much so even within any asset class. Cash flow estimates for stocks 
will typically be subject to larger forecasting errors than real estate etc. Also, stocks are far 
from uniform in their earnings volatility, and some stocks will tend to experience more 
volatile earnings than others. The shipping business has a history of volatility, and as freight 
rates spike or collapse, the valuation of shipping companies tend to follow suit. 
By means of oversimplification, one can argue that freight rate levels are derived from market 
supply and demand. In the long run the market will fluctuate around a state of equilibrium 
where vessel supply equals vessel demand, but there will inevitably be periods of under- and 
overcapacity respectively. Increasing demand for tonnage in any shipping segment will either 
stem from longer sailing routes, higher goods volume or both. To some extent these variations 
in demand can be anticipated, but far from always. Demand shocks (as well as supply shocks) 
will occur from time to time, unsettling the shipping market.  
The sudden occurrence of regional supply or demand of a commodity can initiate such 
shocks, as has been the case time and time again through history. In several places natural gas 
is emerging as a commodity abundant in supply, most notably in North America but also 
potentially in several other regions around the world. In part, the increased availability of 
natural gas is due to new extraction technology, turning unconventional plays previously 
thought uneconomical, into economically sound extraction projects. With natural gas 
expected to make up for some of the projected relative decline in fossil fuels as share of the 
world’s total primary energy demand (TPED) (Statoil ASA, 2012), Liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) carriers and LNG mid- stream vessels seem to be an interesting sector in the shipping 
business. As one of the world’s largest players in LNG transportation at sea, with over 30 
years of experience, and a strategic objective to become an integrated mid- stream player in 
the LNG industry, Golar LNG looks to be an interesting valuation case. 
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1.2 Problem area 
As mentioned, the valuation of an asset will depend on the future estimated cash flow 
generated by the asset. The cash flow depends on revenues and expenses, as illustrated by the 
following formula (nominal terms): 
CF =         
Where, 
 p = Price (rate proceeds etc) 
 y = Output volumes (ships on charter etc) 
 w = input prices (E.g. wages, bunker etc.) 
 x = input volumes (E.g. personnel, bunker consumption etc.) 
In the shipping business the cash flow will mainly be determined by carrier charter rate levels, 
on charter time and operating costs. However, given Golar LNG’s strategy to become a mid- 
stream player in the LNG industry, they will also derive an increasing amount of their income 
from the activities generated by their Floating Storage and Regasification Units (FSRU) and 
perhaps most notably their plans to introduce Floating Liquefaction (FLNG) vessels. Whilst 
FSRU and FLNG may be frontrunners in any region’s early stage as importer/ exporter 
respectively, the vessels may also serve a purpose in exploiting arbitrage opportunities. Such 
opportunities exist whenever there is a divergence in regional prices (including transportation 
costs) for a commodity, which has been the case for natural gas prices the latest years: 
“World gas price developments in 2011 and 2012 brought fresh evidence that a unified global 
gas market with price differences reflecting only transportation cost differences will not be a 
reality anytime soon. While Asian LNG import prices in early May 2012 hovered just below 
18 USD/ MMBtu, European spot prices were in the 9- 9.50 USD/MMBtu range. The US 
Henry Hub reference price dipped below even 2 USD/MMBtu in early 2012 before staging a 
modest recovery to around 2.50 USD/MMBtu in May”. (Statoil ASA, 2012)   
The regional LNG price differences clearly constitute an arbitrage opportunity, which may be 
exploited by increased regional production of gas, or by use of LNG Carriers. 
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1.2.1 Problem statement 
Estimate the value of Golar LNG, and by comparing multiples with peer group companies to 
evaluate if the estimated market value possibly reflects potential added value from mid- 
stream LNG strategy compared to down- stream strategy. 
1.3 Limitations 
I have chosen to use fundamental valuation/ DCF in this thesis, with the supplementation of 
comparative valuation. The supplemental valuation method may indicate if Golar LNG is 
offering a premium value to investors, compared to that offered by down- stream peers, thus 
supporting the possibility that the mid- stream player strategy provides perceived added value 
(e.g. that the market believes there will be higher growth/ earnings for FSRU- / FLNG vessels 
than for carriers). Due to the complexity of the ownership structure of Golar’s fleet, and lack 
of detailed information regarding historical financial measures for the individual vessels I 
have had to make quite a few assumptions. My assumptions are explained and justified in 
chapters 5, 6 and 7. Most assumptions will be conservative rather than liberal. Also, available 
sources for information on charter rate forecasts tend to have limited and ageing info as 
opposed to what can be reviewed on pay-per-view web pages. I have opted to emphasize rate 
forecasts/ -assumptions as suggested by Golar LNG, as they are in line with the view of 
respected analysts. Obviously, these projections may well turn out to be biased – as may all 
forecasts. 
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2 Golar LNG – the company and its operating environment. 
2.1 History & Strategy 
As the name indicates, Golar LNG is a LNG shipping company. It was formed in May 2001 
from its predecessor Osprey Maritime Ltd, but can trace its roots all the way back to 1946 
when Gotaas-Larsen Shipping Corporation was founded. Gotaas Larsen entered the LNG 
shipping arena in 1970 by ordering its first LNG carrier – “Hilli”, which is still a part of the 
fleet. Osprey Maritime Ltd acquired Gotaas Larsen in 1997 and was later taken over itself by 
World Shipholding Ltd, a company indirectly controlled by John Fredriksen and his family. 
The company was listed on Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE) in July 2001 under its current name 
and on NASDAQ in December 2002. Recently the stock was delisted from OSE but can still 
be traded in Norway through its subsequent OTC listing. The company fleet has grown from 6 
vessels in 2001 to today’s fleet of 13 vessels, and a further 13 vessels due to be delivered from 
Q3 2013. The company is currently engaged in acquisition, ownership, operations and 
chartering of LNG carriers, FSRU vessels and has also recently signed a conditional 
agreement for developing its first FLNG vessels, with the aim of launching three converted 
vessels within mid 2015. The three remaining 1
st
 generation carrier vessels in the company’s 
existing fleet have been earmarked for conversion. As the company in 2005 ordered the first 
ever conversion of an existing LNG  carrier into a FSRU vessel, the news of FLNG vessel 
conversion ties in nicely with Golar’s strategic objective of becoming an integrated mid- 
stream player in the LNG industry. (Golar LNG, 2012) 
It is worth mentioning that Golar LNG has embarked on a business model where they “drop 
down” vessels to a limited partnership, Golar LNG Partners (GLMP). This is a way of 
financing growth by raising funds from selling the vessels to the limited partnership at fair 
value and using the proceeds to finance further fleet growth. This also means that Golar 
LNG’s share of the time charter cash flow, generated by the “dropped down” vessels, will be 
reduced to match the company’s rate of ownership in Golar LNG Partners. At the time their 
ownership is 54,1% (of which 2% is as general partner, giving Golar LNG management right 
to legal control of the partnership). There are provisions where the ratio of cash flows to Golar 
LNG from the partnership will be in excess of Golar LNG’s stake, and that is if the cash 
available for distribution will exceed a pre- defined amount, giving Golar LNG (as holder of 
IDRs) a progressively larger share of available cash. 
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Figure 1 Available cash distribution ratios from Golar LNG Partners to limited partners (unitholders), general 
partners and holders of IDRs (Quarterly distribution amount is in USD per share). (Golar LNG Partners, 2013) 
The vessels that are being sold to Golar LNG Partners are all on long term charters, with 
current average contract duration of 9 + years, and the strategy is to continue to drop down 
suitable vessels on long term charters. (Golar LNG Partners, 2012)  
When the partnership strategy was announced, analysts were mostly positive. A common 
view is that Limited Partnerships (In this case Golar Limited Partners) are trading at high 
EBITDA multiples and premiums to underlying asset value. The valuation premium gives the 
partnership a lower cost of capital, making it an efficient way to grow and access capital. 
(Marine Money Group, 2011). Critics have voiced their opinion that the partnership strategy 
is nothing more than a Ponzi scheme, but this claim receives little support, as that would label 
all Limited Partnerships fraudulent (Norhona, 2012). To further support the credibility of the 
partnership, Golar LNG has recently relinquished legal control of the partnership to the board 
of GLMP. 
2.2 About Golar LNG 
The Company’s head office is and will remain in Bermuda (Golar LNG, 2007). It currently 
resides in Hamilton, Bermuda. As is customary in the shipping industry, the company owns, 
leases and operates its vessels (and new builds while under construction) through separate 
subsidiaries and also through the limited partnership. As of Q3 2012, Golar LNG states its 
target as “finance new build program and continue dividend growth without additional equity 
raising or realizing […] investment in Golar Partners” (Golar LNG, 2012). In the following, 
by referring to Golar’s fleet; this includes the vessels owned by Golar LNG Partners. 
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2.3 Operations 
Golar currently operates 2 types of vessels (LNG Carriers and FSRUs) with concept plans 
launched for introducing a 3
rd
 class (FLNGs). 13 vessels are in operation, with an additional 
13 vessels on order for delivery in 2013-2015.  
- FLNG vessels cools natural gas until it liquefies (LNG) and become suitable for 
transport in LNG carriers from one port to another. 
- LNG carriers are high spec tankers, able to keep LNG in its liquefied form during 
transport by maintaining suitable temperature regime (cold). 
- FSRU vessels are designed to transfer LNG from carriers to its own tanks, and to store 
it until discharge to land or to smaller vessels, regasifying the LNG in the process. 
The following three illustrations show Golar’s operational area in the gas industry, and 
provide an up-to-date fleet status (including new builds). 
 
Figure 2 The three segments of operation for Golar (Golar LNG, 2012) 
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Vessels on long term charters are sold to GLMP, the others are being operated by GLNG. 
 
Figure 3 Current Operating Asset portfolio (Golar LNG, 2012) 
 
The portfolio is well positioned to capture the market, given persisting or increased high 
freight rate levels.  
 
Figure 4 Open positions in market. Operating vessels and new builds (Golar LNG, 2012). 
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In the period from 2013-2015 the company has 17 vessels coming off contract or entering the 
market from the new build program. The open positions are expected to generate an increase 
in earnings, as was demonstrated with the recent 5 year contract for the carrier “Golar Maria” 
(Golar LNG, 2012).  As will be discussed further in chapter 4, the many open positions 
present a challenge as well. With the first vessels becoming available this year, it is 
imperative that Golar is able to secure charters for the vessels, and fast. However, with the 
planned conversion of the last three 1
st
 generation carriers (of which two are already in lay- up 
pending commencement of FLNG conversion work) the company’s available fleet will 
consist only of the newest and most attractive vessels the market has to offer. 
2.4 Shareholders and Share price. 
 
 
Figure 5 Shareholders in Golar LNG (Golar LNG, 2012) 
The largest shareholder is World Shipholding Ltd, a company indirectly controlled by John 
Fredriksen and his family. John Fredriksen controlled companies have a history of paying 
high dividends to its shareholders, and as high yield stocks are quite popular in the US, a 
number of US based financial institutions can be found amongst the largest shareholders. 
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The share price has risen significantly since the slump during the financial crisis in 2008-09, 
and has seen an increase exceeding 700% in the last 4 years. The last 12 months the share 
price has been relatively stable at around USD 35-40 per share. 
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3 Valuation theory. 
This chapter is a review of models traditionally used for valuation of companies, followed by 
my reasoning for choosing specific methods over the others. The main source for information 
used in this theoretical chapter is (Penman, 2010) and (Bodie, Kane, & Marcus, Investments, 
eighth edition, 2009). 
3.1 Valuation models 
There are four basic techniques commonly used for valuation: 
- Fundamental valuation 
- Comparative valuation 
- Option based valuation 
- Asset based valuation  
3.1.1 Fundamental valuation 
The method uses publically accessible information such as financial statements etc in 
combination with forecasting. Future cash flows are forecasted based on available information 
and strategic analysis, and are discounted to present value by a reasonable rate of return. 
Common practice is to estimate explicit cash flows over a period of 5 years and then assume 
one or more subsequent periods at steady growth rate (-s).The method is best suited for 
valuing companies that are no longer in the initial growth phase, as earnings for such 
companies are more predictable and historical information is accessible.  
There are two methods to choose from:  
- Value of the firm by discounting FCFF (Free Cash Flows for the firm) 
- Value of equity by discounting FCFE (Free Cash Flows to equity holders) 
By subtracting and adding debt respectively, both methods can be used to derive the value as 
estimated by the other, and they should be consistent. 
The formulas for the two methods (FCFF and FCFE) are as listed below: 
FCFF =                                                              
And 
FCFE =      —                                              
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Where 
 EBIT  = Earnings before interest and tax 
 tc  = Corporate tax rate 
 NWC  = Net working capital 
 
The value of the firm and equity respectively is calculated as follows: 
 
Firm value =   
     
         
 
    
  
 
         
         
  
       
      
 
Equity value =  
     
      
 
 
    
  
 
      
          
  
       
    
 
Where, 
 T = Number of years in the explicit period 
VT  = Terminal value to firm (F) and to equity (E) respectively 
g  = Terminal growth rate 
ρE  = Cost of equity 
The terminal value is being used to avoid adding present values of an infinite sum of cash 
flows. In the example above, the terminal value is the present value of a constant growth 
perpetuity, which can be substituted for multiples of EBIT, book value, earnings etc. 
3.1.2 Comparative valuation 
As the name implies, this method derives the value of a company by comparing it to 
information about other companies and their pricing. Comparative valuation is quite easy, not 
very time consuming to perform and thereby commonly used. 
Firstly, one identifies comparable firms, then multiples are calculated from selected 
accountable financial measures in this peer group, and finally the median/ average of those 
multiples are applied to the corresponding financial measures for the target firm in order to 
estimate a market value. One should be aware however that this method is only as accurate as 
19 
 
the companies and financial measures used in the comparison. If for example one or more of 
the companies are in different phases of the life cycle compared to the target company, the 
multiples will not be very comparable. Also it can be argued that by choosing to include and 
/or omit certain financial measures one can easily arrive at a biased valuation. Last but not 
least, the comparative valuation method does not take into account the state of the markets in 
general. Erroneously valued markets will cause the target company to be erroneously valued 
as well.   
Commonly used measures are: 
- P/B (Price to Book). 
Suggested Company value is found by multiplying its balance sheet equity by a 
multiple commonly used for the company’s group of industry peers. The multiple will 
not be the same for different industries, and will typically be higher in growth 
industries than in mature industries. 
 
P/B= 
                      
                                
  
 
- P/E (Price to Earnings). 
Suggested Company value is found by multiplying its current earnings by a multiple 
reflecting risk- and growth expectations in the industry. This is the most commonly 
used multiple, and it is often calculated as an average of observed P/E multiples for 
similar companies in the industry. The multiple will typically be higher in perceived 
growth industries/ -companies than in a classic blue chip company. It is important to 
distinguish between P/E ratios calculated on actual or estimated earnings respectively. 
 
P/E= 
                      
                                   
 
 
- EV/ EBIT (Enterprise value/ Earnings before interest and tax). 
Suggested Company value is calculated by multiplying EBIT with a multiple 
commonly used for the company’s group of industry peers. EBITDA may be used 
instead of EBIT as denominator, but for capital intensive companies, depreciation and 
amortization, while non- cash charges, reflect real expenses associated with wear and 
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tear on the firm’s assets. If an investor wishes to capture the need for reinvestments 
EBIT should be the preferred denominator. 
 
EV/EBIT= 
                                  
    
 
 
- P/ S (Market value of equity/ revenue) 
Suggested company value is calculated by multiplying last year’s revenue by a 
multiple commonly used for the company’s group of industry peers.  
P/S= 
                      
       
 
 
One important note is that many analysts prefer to use EV/EBIT or Price/Sales to at least put 
the other calculated multiples in context. It is not uncommon that companies resort to 
“window dressing”, that is; to make the financial statements look as positive as possible. 
EV/EBIT and P/S will limit such options to a greater extent than e.g. P/E does. 
3.1.3 Option based valuation 
An option is defined as a right but not a duty to buy or sell an asset at a certain time and at a 
set price. (Hull, 2012) In many ways a company works by the same mechanisms, since the 
management or board of directors can choose to act or not act upon business opportunities and 
investment decisions. The option based approach to valuation aims to assign a value to 
decision options and decision flexibility, thereby treating the company as a portfolio of real 
options.  
Basically the options may be to: 
- Delay a project. 
- Commence a project due to potential beneficiary opportunities arising as a result. 
- Abandon a project. 
In practice, this method is sometimes used as a supplement to fundamental valuation by 
isolating flexibility from the fundamental value and calculating it as a separate value by way 
of option pricing. The estimated present value of an option is then added on to the calculated 
equity value from the fundamental valuation to find the value of the company’s equity. The 
alternative to using supplementing option based valuation is to make sure the flexibility is 
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directly reflected in the forecasted cash flows used in the fundamental valuation. For example, 
due to overcapacity and failure to secure financing, several cancellations of ship new builds 
have been observed over the last few years. Normally, such cancellations have had an effect 
on a firm’s market value, so clearly there is value connected with the action/ option. Investors 
may choose to price this effect as an option, or to simply include one or more cancellations in 
the forecasted cash flows from a certain point in time. The problem facing an investor will be 
the same in both instances; what value should one assign to the option?  
3.1.4 Asset based valuation. 
Asset based Valuation estimates a company’s value by identifying and summing the value of 
its assets. The value of equity is then calculated by deducting the debt value. This looks easy 
enough, but a significant problem is what is omitted from a company’s balance sheet. 
Intangible assets are only included on a balance sheet if they have been purchased, and as 
such have been assigned an objective/ unbiased value. This means that for example a brand 
name will not be given a value using asset based valuation and neither will synergy effects, 
intellectual property or e.g. the conversion of an office building to a production facility. 
Strictly speaking however, this method can be used with some accuracy for companies that 
own for the most part easily marketable assets. Unless markets are under severe credit 
rationing (as during the financial turmoil in 2008- 2009) real estate companies and shipping 
companies will typically have access to well functioning second hand markets for their assets, 
thereby being able to estimate an accurate value of their equity. The same goes for companies 
which main assets are natural resources. Indeed these firms are sometimes referred to as 
“asset based companies”. When mapped, the resources can quite accurately be given an 
estimated value which will form a base for valuation of the company after deducting the debt. 
This method can also be used with some credibility when liquidating a company, normally at 
a lower value than in the case of continued operations. 
3.2 Choosing a method 
Ultimately it is the expected cash flows that will serve as a baseline for valuation of any 
company. However, the generated cash flow is affected by several forces (drivers). The main 
value drivers for the residual stakeholders (shareholders) in a shipping company are amongst 
others; Operations, Risk Management and Financing. These drivers can in turn be influenced 
to a varying degree by a company’s strategy, its management and also by the operating 
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environment (in wide terms – the world economy). Discussing how to best value a shipping 
company, it can be argued that there is a well functioning second hand ship-market, thus 
enabling investors to at any point in time calculate an asset based valuation. However, today’s 
pricing of an asset may not be even remotely accurate in the distant future, and as 6 of Golar’s 
vessels (mainly FSRUs) are all tied up in very long term charters, how can one accurately 
estimate the market value of a vessel not becoming available for sale until 10- 20 years from 
now?  Looking at the new build prices over the last 10 years, they have varied from USD 150 
mill to USD 250 mill. Apart from difficulties in assessing long term asset valuations, the asset 
based valuation method will also fail to include value drivers such as operations- and to some 
extent risk management. Golar LNG’s plans for converting old carriers to FLNG vessels will 
not be accounted for in an asset based valuation of those vessels; neither will the estimated 10 
year life extension to those vessels. (Golar LNG Partners, 2012) Arguably they should not be 
considered either; however according to Golar, such converted vessels can be launched in H2 
2015. Also, the company is evaluating FSRU conversion of 2 of its carrier new builds. (Golar 
LNG, 2012) 
It is obvious that when pricing a company by its balance sheet alone, one will not take into 
account that companies are managed in different ways and by different people. For this reason 
I have chosen not to value Golar LNG by way of asset based valuation (as reported in the 
balance sheet).   
The same reasoning is used when opting not to solely use comparative valuation. As 
companies are managed in different ways and have different strategies, it seems insufficient to 
calculate their value by using the same multiple (-s). Additionally, there are not that many 
directly comparable peers available. Comparative analysis is a good tool for checking the 
credibility of one’s own valuation conclusions, and can also be used to check if traits that set a 
company apart from its peers seem to be included in the market valuations. If for example 
Golar LNG (aspiring to be a mid stream player) is trading at higher multiples than its down- 
stream peers, this may indicate the market is assigning a premium to the mid stream 
positioning strategy. 
As mentioned in chapter 2.1, there is a possibility that GLNG will receive a larger portion of 
the earnings in GLMP than their 54,1% stake in the partnership. Although not an option as 
much as a possibility, this upside could potentially be priced as a call option. The problem 
however is that it is hard to say how many vessels will be dropped down to GLMP, and 
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subsequently to predict when and if the earnings will reach a level entitling GLNG to payoffs 
according to its IDR’s. Any attempted pricing of this “option” is bound to be affected by so 
many assumptions that I have chosen not to do it. At the moment the IDR’s are not in effect, 
but if they ever take effect, this would represent an upside in GLNG earnings. 
By excluding the other methods, my valuation of Golar LNG will be done by way of 
fundamental analysis. As Golar LNG is operating in a capital intensive industry, and 
companies controlled by John Fredriksen are renowned for innovative financing/ leveraging, 
one can expect the debt-to-equity ratio to change substantially on a regular basis for Golar 
LNG. It therefore makes sense to first value the firm and then to find the equity value by 
subtracting net debt at the time. By the above reasoning, directly calculating the value of the 
equity would be more complicated. 
An important element in the fundamental analysis will be the value of expected cash flows 
from not yet officially contracted projects. Mid- stream growth is implied in Golar LNG’s 
official strategy, and in the fourth quarter 2012 presentation, they reiterate this by stating: 
“Limited undedicated FSRU tonnage in market […] market will require new builds” 
“[Regarding FSRU, company has..] Ability to build speculatively” 
“Significant interest from the market for fast track modular liquefaction solution that is very 
competitive with land based alternatives” 
In my calculations I will not price in additional new builds, but I will assume the 3 old carriers 
are converted into FLNG vessels. The value of the FLNG conversions will be estimated as 
discounted cash flows and not as option based value.  
 
The valuation model will be as follows: 
The total value of the firm’s equity will be calculated via the FCFF by using the summed 
EBIT contribution from 4 segment values, less the negative EBIT contribution from 
general company costs.  
The 4 segments to have EBIT estimated separately are: 
- Existing Carrier fleet 
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- Existing FSRU fleet 
- Prospective converted FLNG fleet 
- New build fleet as a whole 
A final note on the method; I am aware my chosen method can arguably be labeled a “hybrid” 
asset based valuation, as the vessels (assets) are being valued independently (by their DCF). 
However, according to Penman (2010), asset based valuation does not require forecasting. In 
other words, according to Penman, asset based valuation is done by balance sheet alone, not 
by discounting cash flows. 
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4 Strategic Analysis 
This chapter will briefly discuss projections for world energy demand but will mainly be a 
strategic analysis of the company and its operating environment. A strategic analysis seeks to 
identify opportunities and threats (external) and weaknesses and strengths (internal). In this 
thesis, the external analysis will be given priority. 
4.1 Energy markets and gas industry developments. 
4.1.1 World energy projections 
Long term estimates and projections for periods of 25-30 years will not allow for unforeseen 
events. Such unforeseen events are typically the ones that may cause a change in trend, and 
estimates to become less accurate. Estimates will also vary depending on one’s bias and 
choice of method and models. Different institutions will have different growth estimates, 
however there is not much dissent over whether or not the demand for energy will increase or 
decrease in the long run – It will increase. 
It is foreseen that energy efficiency will increase along with increased energy demand, and by 
that reduce the rate of demand growth somewhat. In other words, the energy demand will 
most likely not rise at the same rate as the increase in world GDP. Higher energy efficiency/ 
lower energy intensity is caused by different factors such as technology and policies, most 
notably policies due to heightened awareness of the proposed man made climate-crisis. Of 
particular interest for the Global Gas industry is the projected changes in global energy mix 
(see fig 9). 
4.1.2 Gas Industry development 
Recent short term development suggests sluggish demand and growing supply for natural gas. 
There are however regional variations. In 2011, the demand in Europe fell, it rose slightly in 
the US, and Asia (spearheaded by China and Japan) saw a considerable increase. The reasons 
and time perspective for demand variations are several, but for the most part, demand is 
affected by weather, political measures, supply shifts, income vs. price, technology policy and 
pricing of substitutes. In Europe, the demand fell due to absent economic growth, mild 
weather and carbon emission prices favoring coal over gas. The slight increase in US demand 
was caused by gas supply growth and a subsequent drop in gas prices offsetting the negative 
effects on demand from mild weather. Demand for gas in Japan increased due to the limited 
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power output from the country’s nuclear plants after the Fukushima disaster, and in China the 
gas demand rose as a result of government energy policies. 
In the long run however, there are other factors that will affect the gas industry. According to 
Statoil’s projections, an average yearly increase of 1.6% in world gas demand over the next 
30 years is to be expected (base scenario, excluding shifts to the underlying trend in the world 
economy) (Statoil ASA, 2012). 
Sustained growth in demand requires steady and uninterrupted supply, and this seems more 
likely now than just a few years ago, with huge reserves being uncovered around the world. 
Pipeline construction is both ongoing and being planned from Russia and the Middle East into 
Europe and Asia. Unconventional plays and newly discovered conventional reserves around 
the world may also contribute to more steady regional supply. Of the projected increase in 
world demand for natural gas, LNG demand is expected to play a role; increasing from 
today’s 280 Million Tons Per Annum (mtpa) to potentially 400 mtpa by 2020 and 500 mtpa 
by 2030. 
 
Figure 6 Projected Global LNG capacity and demand. (Ernst & Young, 2013) 
It is obvious that unless LNG demand turns out to be higher than expected, any additional 
speculative LNG export capacity is bound to cause LNG supply-side competition. 
 Australian LNG is set for large scale export once the ongoing construction of liquefaction 
plants is finished, and several other regions are either in a construction or planning phase for 
LNG export, ref fig 7. 
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The US may be considered a somewhat special case, as despite its vast gas reserves, and a 
persisting situation of domestic natural gas oversupply, the US government has so far 
expressed hesitation towards exporting LNG. The government wishes to re-establish the 
country’s self sustainability for fossil fuels; a luxury that hasn’t been enjoyed in over 40 
years, and as a result only one out of a dozen proposed LNG export projects has yet managed 
to secure all necessary contracts and required permits. This policy may cause the gas price 
(Henry Hub) in North America to remain at a low level for some time, but it is expected that 
eventually the US gas producers will be allowed to export LNG, especially once the 
consumers and production industry are back on their feet after “The Great Recession” and 
have increased affordability for higher energy prices. 
 
Figure 7 Projected LNG supplies (Golar LNG Partners, 2011) 
Since the above illustration was issued, there have been changes in the projections, and 
several liquefaction plants have had construction delays, however it is expected that 
liquefaction capacity picks up by 2016.  
4.2 External analysis 
The purpose of the external analysis is to chart Golar LNG’s operating environment, to better 
assess the level of competition in the business. The analysis will be performed using Michael 
E. Porter’s Five Forces Model. 
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Figure 8 Five forces that determine the competitive intensity (and attractiveness) of a market (Grahams Child, 2006) 
In the following, all five forces will be discussed, with the inclusion of policymakers and 
regulations under substitutes. 
4.2.1 Competitors (Rivalry) 
Under “perfect market conditions” all profits would be competed away, and business strategy 
would be obsolete. In the real world however, even if markets are relatively efficient, there 
will always be “pockets of imperfection” (The international society for decision support 
systems, 1995). Some companies will hold an advantage over other companies, giving them 
the edge. Such advantages may be short lasted or persistent. 
In the LNG shipping business, the fiercest competition over the next few years will be in the 
carrier segment. This due to the fact (as explained in chapter 4.2.3) that the next few years 
may see an oversupply of carriers relative to liquefaction capacity. In the carrier market, 
Golar LNG does not appear to hold an advantage over their competitors. Its carriers are 
mainly operating on spot rates or short term contracts, and as such Golar is as- or more 
vulnerable to volatility as other large shipping companies such as Hoegh LNG, BW Gas, and 
Teekay.  These shippers have more carriers on long term contracts, and are therefore less 
exposed to down- and upside in charter rates. As a consequence, the stocks have lower 
volatility than GLNG, which is confirmed by lower beta-values (just under 1 according to 
financial websites). From history and other shipping segments, we know that ships will 
continue to accept cargo even below breakeven rates, so it is to be expected that the rivalry 
can be fierce and potentially damaging if carrier rate levels go down.  
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For FSRUs the market is tighter, and is expected to remain so in the foreseeable future. As the 
only company to have completed fast track FSRU conversion projects, and with an ability to 
build speculatively, Golar LNG claims to be uniquely positioned to capture opportunities in a 
tight FSRU market. (Golar LNG, 2012) Recently the company was named the preferred 
bidder for Jordan FSRU, and they own the only FSRU vessel available in 2013. According to 
Golar LNG, they see strong opportunities, and limited competition in the FSRU market.  
FLNG vessels are still in the development stages, and it is hard to tell how the competition 
will be, but as one of the pioneers also in this segment, Golar LNG is in a position today that 
may see them as a strong FLNG market player eventually. There are other FLNG projects 
ongoing, but with a forecasted lack of worldwide liquefaction capacity relative demand, it is 
to be expected that the market is there to be conquered.  
Of the previously mentioned peers (Hoegh LNG, BW Gas and Teekay) only Hoegh seems 
directly comparable as they have carriers and FSRUs as well as advanced FLNG development 
plans. The two others are not specifically involved in FSRU/FLNG as of early 2013, and are 
also too diversified into other segments such as crude oil and product tankers to be directly 
comparable.  There are other shippers that are comparable, but as they are privately held, it is 
hard to use them for comparison. From what I can see, Golar and Hoegh are the only two 
publically traded 100% specialized LNG shippers in the mid- stream segment. 
4.2.2 Bargaining power of suppliers 
The more differentiated a product is, the higher the bargaining power of the supplier. (Hitt, 
Ireland, & Hoskisson, 2001) Golar LNG’s main suppliers are shipyards building their ships, 
so this is where they are the most exposed to supplier bargaining. However the company also 
has suppliers on the operational side, most notably staffing, fuel and maintenance. 
The shipbuilding industry will tend to overheat and deepfreeze along with the spikes and 
slumps in the shipping business. When order books are full, the yards may set higher prices or 
reduce quality of the delivered product to increase profits. If on the other hand the orders are 
sparse, the yards have a weakened position and may have to accept lower prices and more 
sophisticated delivery options. As it is, Golar LNG is part of a John Fredriksen owned group 
of maritime companies (Seadrill, Golden Ocean Group, Frontline, Frontline 2012, Ship 
Finance) and their subsidiaries. This group of companies constitutes one of the largest 
maritime contracting company clusters in the world, and has time and time again showed its 
ability to negotiate (and execute) favorable terms and conditions. Due to the combined size of 
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the Fredriksen- dominated group of companies, Golar LNG will probably have stronger 
supplier bargaining position relative to most of their competitors. 
4.2.3 Bargaining power of customers 
Customer’s bargaining powers will be determined by their dependency of a company. In other 
words; if a company’s services are in high demand, the customers have little bargaining 
power. Reversely the customer will be in a strong bargaining position if they do not depend 
much on a company’s services. As previously noted, Golar does not currently operate much 
of their fleet on long term contracts. Only 8 of the 26 vessels (existing and new builds) are 
tied up beyond 2014, and of those 8 only 4 are LNG carriers. Should the rates drop 
substantially in the next couple of years; the company may suffer reduced earnings if 
operating in the spot market or it can be bullied into accepting sub- optimal contract freight 
rates. On the other hand, should the rate level increase, then the table is turned and the 
customers are at Golar’s mercy. 
The company could charter out more vessels on favorable long term contracts (as recently 
done for “Golar Maria”) to reduce the risk, but on the other hand that may not be possible. 
That the fleet’s FSRUs are all on very long contracts but few carriers, may just as well be a 
result of relative customer strength in the carrier market, and that the customers expect to 
secure tonnage at lower rates in the future. In fact there is only one FSRU vessel available for 
charter in 2013, and most new FSRU projects are all on 5 year + terms. 
The going concern is also that liquefaction capacity cannot keep up with the carrier capacity 
in the next couple of years, and thereby will put downward pressure on the carrier rates. 
Shipping analysts expect the carrier capacity to increase by 16% over the next 2 years, but 
liquefaction capacity to rise by no more than 9.7% in the same period, thus potentially causing 
carrier oversupply and possible rate slump unless offset by longer sailing routes (Bloomberg, 
2012). 
However, if Golar LNG follows through with its plans to become a fully integrated mid 
stream payer, they may in a couple of years be in a position to benefit from a potentially tight 
liquefaction and regasification market. Relatively low carrier rates due to lacking liquefaction 
capacity may result in very favorable day-rates for the FLNG vessels as customers seek to 
take advantage of carrier rates that are off the highs, and what is assumed to be a continued 
arbitrage opportunity with considerable regional gas price differences. 
31 
 
4.2.4 Threat of new entrants 
There are numerous suggested barriers to market entrance in different industries. Apart from 
capital cost they range from Government regulations to intellectual property and advertising. 
This analysis will focus on capital, technology and access to markets. In the case of LNG 
carriers, the main barriers will not be insurmountable. Yard capacity and financial funding 
channels are available, and the technology is well known. Market access is also available, 
with the order book for new builds not being completely disproportionate to expected market 
demand for LNG transport. In other words, the freight rates are not seen to enter crisis 
territory anytime soon (although a short term dip is possible the next couple of years).  
FSRU vessels may present greater obstacles in the form of technology, capital and the bidding 
process as tendered by project owners. Most FSRUs today are being built for specific 
regasification projects as instigated by large industrial players or countries. Naturally the 
tendering parties will evaluate not only the cost of the project bids, but also the bidders 
perceived ability to deliver on time and with technology guaranteed to adhere to 
environmental and safety standards. When competing against large established players such 
as Hoegh and Golar plus some private companies (E.g. Excelarate energy), new entries may 
prove very difficult indeed. 
For FLNG vessels/projects there are none established industry leading companies, but it 
seems logical that if a company has problems gaining entrance to the FSRU market, then 
establishing itself in the FLNG market will be even harder. The technology is newer, and the 
capital costs will be relatively higher as the vessels will be more or less prototypes. With 
Golar LNG having successfully converted several LNG carriers into FSRU vessels, they may 
have an advantage over new entrants when it comes to building/ modifying FLNG vessels as 
well. The company is amongst the very first in the business to venture into FLNG territory 
and this may prove an advantage if and when the FLNG market opens up. 
Overall, the threat of new entrants is not looming. The chance of shipping companies 
presently operating in other cargo segments suddenly turning their attention to the LNG 
industry is not very likely, at least not on a large scale and in the near future. 
4.2.5 Substitute Products 
For a gas carrier company, as is Golar LNG, there are three types of substitutes: 
- Alternative energy sources. 
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- Alternative gas transportation channels. 
- Regional supply. 
Alternative energy sources will always be a concern for any tradable energy source – and 
natural gas is no exception. As mentioned the demand growth and price for natural gas is 
diversified in different parts of the world, and as such the threat from substitutes will not be 
uniform worldwide. However, it can be said that the main fossil energy substitute to natural 
gas at present is coal. With low coal prices, carbon pricing in single digits, abundant regional 
supply and many operational plants and plants under construction, coal is a considerable 
threat – at least in the short run. The current enthusiasm for renewable energy has yet to 
materialize into real supply, but is expected to take hold over the next decades. However, the 
impact of the individual alternative energy sources varies from region to region, and also 
within demand segment consumption. Within industry, transport and to a certain degree 
power, oil is the main substitute. Renewables is and will mostly be a substitute in power 
supply, and the unlikely, but ongoing, resurrection of coal (especially in Europe) may reduce 
demand for gas for heating purposes. 
 
Figure 9 Shares of primary global energy demand (Statoil ASA, 2012) 
The only significant substitute to gas carriers for gas transportation is pipelines, which can be 
a great alternative to LNG carriers. For the time being, there are plans to significantly expand 
the pipeline capacity in Eurasia, with the possible addition of a northern and a southern route 
from Russia, and another from the Caspian area into Europe. However, as Russia (Gazprom) 
continues to defend the traditionally higher index linked gas prices in Europe, there may be 
arbitrage opportunities, allowing for carrier gas import to Europe still.  
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Asia may also see quite a few hydrocarbon supply pipelines being constructed in the next 
decade, with gas supply mainly coming from the former soviet –‘stans’ and the Middle East 
(Iran). But there are gas sources that cannot be accessed with pipelines; any export from 
America, Africa and Australia is bound to be via LNG carriers, and as long as the world’s 
demand for natural gas is growing, these sources will be tapped at some point in time as well. 
In the long run, regional supply may also reduce the need for gas carriers (and pipelines). 
With new gas reserves being uncovered around the world, there is a chance the need for gas 
transport will diminish. For example, China is on an official policy to ramp up natural gas 
production, and they do have vast shale gas reserves. But as we have seen previously with oil, 
and in fact also electricity, it is likely there will continue to be trading and transportation, 
exploiting arbitrage opportunities in the quest for profits, and ensuring steady supply. 
4.2.6 Conclusion external analysis 
 
Figure 10 Level of operating threats to Golar LNG (0- none, 5- high) 
It seems that, due to its mid- stream strategy, Golar LNG will be more diversified than many 
of its competitors, and that the company will not be as vulnerable to charter rate fluctuations 
as the down- stream LNG transporters which derive their earnings solely from carrier 
operation. The fact that short- term liquefaction capacity is lagging worldwide, and that 
several new plays are opening up offshore, may turn out to be an excellent business 
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opportunity. Not only will it generate earnings directly from employed FLNG vessels, but it 
will also help improve the operating terms in the carrier market, by reducing carrier fleet due 
to conversions and also prolong the useful lives for old converted carriers. 
However, the big question is how the LNG trade will fare over the next years and even 
decades. No example illustrates this better than a US that is currently brimming with LNG 
reserves. Only 5-6 years ago the US was tipped as the big importer of gas, but this prophecy 
fell in tatters almost overnight with the introduction of shale gas extraction technology and 
other conventional gas play discoveries in North America. Needless to say, multiple gas 
discoveries around the globe may eventually have an impact on the LNG shipping business, if 
regional supply results in shorter sailing routes or no sailing routes at all. 
Given there will be a future LNG shipping market however; Golar LNG seems to be in no less 
favorable position than many other shippers. It is exposed more than others to risk of carrier 
overcapacity, but at the same time has upside potential if the rates stay high or increase. Also, 
Golar LNG has shown the ability to adapt, and to exploit opportunities. 
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5 Balance sheet and financial results 
Common practice when budgeting future cash flows via forecasted return- and growth rates, 
is to reformulate historical balance sheets and cash flow statements. The balance sheet is 
reorganized in operation- and financial related assets as well as operational- and financial 
liabilities. The cash flow statement is also rearranged to amongst other include ‘dirty surplus’ 
that otherwise would go straight against the balance sheet, and also to present a breakdown of 
earnings. This to better be able to forecast e.g. sales income based on historical numbers. 
(Sørensen, 2009) 
However, to assign a growth rate to Golar LNG’s future income based on historical 
accounting numbers seems counterproductive. True, one can argue that historical average 
time charter rates for the company as a whole can be used for forecasting, but this will not 
capture the changes in the company’s vessel- class ratios. Nor are historical rate levels 
necessarily a very good measure for what level the rates will be at in the future. From the 
analyst predictions cited in chapter 4.2.3, and Golar’s plans (ref: fig 3 and 4) to maybe convert 
2 carriers to FSRUs and 3 carriers to FLNGs, it is evident that the composition of the 
company fleet’s vessel- class ratio is bound to shift away from carriers, at least in the near 
term. Conversion of carriers to FSRUs/ FLNGs will, according to the company, increase the 
EBITDA for those vessels significantly and should be reflected in the forecast. 
 
Figure 11 Typical charter contributions (Golar LNG, 2012) 
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I will therefore estimate the operational cash flow (FCFF) from all vessels, correcting for 
depreciation and investments. By deducting the expenses for company general costs, a total 
FCFF for Golar LNG can be calculated. 
5.1 Income 
5.1.1 Charter rates 
There are two main characteristics to consider when forecasting charter rates; spot rates vs. 
contract rates. In my calculations I will assume that FSRUs and FLNGs will all be on long 
term contracts, and that 25% of the carriers will be in the spot market, whilst 75% will be on 
some sort of contract (the distinction between spot and contract respectively will be necessary 
when estimating time in operation). FSRUs and FLNGs costs more to construct, so they are 
mostly built following a successful tender for export-/import project, hence – they will all be 
on contract. The reasoning for choosing a 25% spot ratio for carriers is that of the company’s 
9 existing carriers, 2 are currently not on any sort of contract (2 in 9 equals 22%) and, on 
average, roughly 25% of today’s total contracted and existing world carrier fleet tonnage is 
currently uncommitted between 2014- 2020.  
 
Figure 12 Estimated LNG carrier fleet status committed vs. uncommitted. (Golar LNG, 2012) 
37 
 
Rates will be as in the charter contracts (all options assumed exercised) and thereafter 
estimated to the best of my ability. As any rate projections I can make for the next 50 years 
are bound to be highly uncertain I have chosen to use the estimated EBITDA contribution 
stated by Golar (fig 11) as they are also supported by some analysts. DNB markets in 2012 
raised their rate expectations for the period of 2014-2017 to the equivalent of annual vessel 
EBITDA USD 40 mill for large 2
nd
 generation LNG carriers (DNB markets, 2012). Arctic 
Securities are a little less optimistic, expecting a drop in vessels EBITDA’s to around USD 
30-35 mill in 2014-2015 (CNBC, 2012) Currently there are no new builds on order for 
delivery after 2017, so from then on any predictions are even more uncertain; it could go 
either way, depending on amongst other how many ships are built. At some point however, it 
makes sense to let the rate level increase in line with inflationary expectations, and I have 
done that from 2026 (reason being that is when the last of Golar’s current charter contacts 
expires). The inflationary expectations are derived from central banks’ inflationary targets and 
also being kept at 2% not to exceed GDP projections for OECD countries. The level of 
uncertainty when it comes to charter rates emphasizes the need for a sensitivity analysis to 
check what impact changes in the assumptions will have for the valuation of the company. 
5.1.2 Time in operation 
FSRU and FLNG time in operation is estimated at 95% for duration of life, the 5% out of 
operation time to allow for downtime, repositioning and maintenance between contracts. Time 
in operation for carriers on contract is estimated at 90% throughout their remaining life. For 
carriers on spot rates, time in operation is estimated at 75% throughout their remaining life. 
Estimated downtime for carriers includes dry docking. Summing the time in operation 
(assuming 17 carriers, 6 FSRUs and 3 FLNGs) gives a fleet- average time in operation of just 
below 90%. Compared to the last two years fleet- average time in operation of 92%, my 
estimate is on the conservative side. 
5.1.3 Gain on asset sales. 
No major gain reported on asset-sales the last 3 years, with the exception of the one-time-
occurrence in 2012 on “gain on loss of control”. As the company is expanding, and converting 
its oldest carriers into FSRUs and FLNGs it is assumed they will not dispose of any assets. 
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5.2 Expenses 
5.2.1 Operational cost 
As it is hard to find the exact operational costs per ship/ vessel class, the costs will not be 
stated separately. Instead they will be incorporated with the estimated charter rates, and an 
estimated EBITDA will be used in the cash flow projections. For each announced contract, 
Golar LNG has issued press releases with an estimated generated EBITDA which will be used 
in my calculations. For ships not yet on charter hire, an estimated contract value will be 
assigned on basis of the discussion in 5.1.1. Additionally, most of the existing long term 
charter contracts are set up in a way that will allow rate increases to compensate for cost 
inflation; keeping the EBITDA stable, which is yet another reason to focus on the EBITDA 
contribution rather than separate income-/ cost segments. 
5.2.2 Dry dock 
In 2010, 2011 and 2012 the average annual dry dock costs per ship was approximately USD 3 
mill (Golar Lng, 2013). However, the company at the same time states they are expecting 
inflationary pressure on dry docking costs. In my forecast I will therefore assume dry docking 
costs of USD 3 mill per vessel in 2013, thereafter increasing by an annual inflation rate of 2%, 
regardless of age or class. The annual increase is due to the company itself has expressed 
specific concern for such inflationary pressure concerning these costs (Golar Lng, 2013). As 
most maintenance will be done according to class requirements (most often every 5 years), 
assigning a cost to every year will also somewhat take into account the company’s practice of 
deferring dry dock costs 2-5 years. Given the new builds will massively reduce the fleets 
average vessel age; my assumption can be regarded as conservative. 
5.2.3 Interest 
The weighted average interest rate on the company’s debt is 3,97% (Golar Lng, 2013). 
Although the lending rate is assumed to go up at one point in time, it is hard to say when, so I 
will use 3,97% in my calculations. 
5.2.4 Tax 
The company is taxable for operations conducted by its subsidiaries in UK and Brazil, and 
may (if they do not qualify for exemption) be taxable in the US. However, the company 
firmly believes it qualifies for said US exemption. As it is not certain where the company will 
operate/ not operate in the future, it is therefore hard to estimate a future tax rate, so I will 
simply assume today’s rate to be valid throughout. The company also had a balance post of 
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deferred tax benefits related to intra- group transfers of long term assets, but that post has 
been written off and recognized as part of gain on loss of control (see also 5.4.2. and 5.4.3). 
Based on the average amount of income tax (before amortization of deferred tax benefit) over 
the last three years, I will use a tax rate of 4% in my calculations. 
5.2.5 Loss on asset sales 
As for gain on asset sales, this post will also be assumed to be zero. 
5.2.6 Depreciation 
Vessel useful life is 40-50 years as stated in the company’s 2012 annual report. I will use 50 
years in my calculations, assuming life extensions to old vessels due to upgrades (Golar LNG 
Partners, 2012). As I cannot find the historical cost for the individual vessels, the balance total 
vessel value will be straight line depreciated (Golar LNG, 2012) throughout remaining life 
relative each vessels remaining useful life. There is no mentioning of a set salvage value in 
the annual reports, so I will assume the salvage value to be USD 6 mill per vessel.  
New builds will also be written off at straight line depreciation. The total committed sum for 
new builds is approx. USD 2.700 mill (Golar LNG, 2012). I will assume the FSRUs are at 
USD 300 mill each, and the carriers are at USD 190 mill each. Consequently, I will use USD 
5,9 mill. per year for new build FSRUs, and 3,7 mill per year for new build Carriers 
respectively. 
The annual depreciation for existing vessels will be as shown in the below table. 
 
Figure 13 Annual depreciation for existing fleet vessels (The table is assuming FLNG conversion of 3 old carriers at 
USD 100 mill per vessel) 
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According to Golar’s accounting practice, depreciation will only start once a vessel is 
delivered/ ready for use. (Golar Lng, 2013) 
NOTE: The balance asset value of USD 1766 mill. is from the unaudited 4
th
 quarter 2012 
report, as it is easier to make sure the correct vessel depreciation values are calculated prior to 
the effects of deconsolidation of GLMP and the “gain on loss of control”. 
5.3 Dividend 
Dividend is expected to increase from today’s level, without the raising of additional equity 
(SeekingAlpha.com, 2013). At today’s rate the dividend is USD 1,70 per year. As the 
dividend is not an important factor in my valuation of the company, I will not make 
projections, but it is assumed the dividend will increase from today’s level, given increased 
earnings. 
5.4 Balance 
Consolidated balance sheets can be reviewed in the appendix section. With visual simplicity 
in mind, minor posts have been pooled and given the reference ‘other…’ As the numbers 
therein are not all relevant for my valuation analysis, I will only briefly comment the main 
classes. 
5.4.1 Current assets 
Steep increase in cash during 2012, which is mainly due to sale of vessels to GLMP.  
5.4.2 Long term assets 
Investments and new builds have increased during 2012, and vessels and capital leases have 
been reduced. This is due to the one- time accounting effect of gain on loss of control 
(deconsolidation of GLMP) and also transfer of vessels to GLMP and paid new build 
installments. 
5.4.3 Current liabilities 
Mark- to- market effect of currency-/ interest rate swaps have reduced the ‘other’ liabilities 
post, and overall current liabilities are down due to sale of vessels. 
5.4.4 Long term liabilities 
Debt reduced due to sale of vessels. Also, the capital lease obligations have been eliminated. 
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5.4.5 Equity 
Sharp increase in retained earnings due to the one-time accounting effect of gain on loss of 
control (in GLMP). 
As stated in chapter 2.2, the company does not intend to raise equity, so share capital will be 
kept unchanged at USD 80.504.000,- (USD 1 * number of shares).  
5.5 Working capital 
Working capital is defined as current assets less current liabilities. Changes in working capital 
will affect the cash flow, as a company for example increase their stock of goods, accounts 
payables, account receivables etc. Golar LNG does not carry large and fluctuating inventories, 
and unless payment terms changes substantially, then the working capital is not very likely to 
fluctuate. One may argue that a doubling in fleet size will potentially double the working 
capital, but as this would probably be a “one time blow” (and not a very large one) I have 
chosen to assume no changes in working capital, and that over the years, any changes in 
current assets is offset by a similar change in current liabilities. 
5.6 Investments 
5.6.1 New builds. 
Of the committed USD 2.700 mill for new build investments, installments of roughly USD 
435 mill has been paid as of 31 Dec 2012. The remaining is due as follows (Golar LNG, 
2012): 
- 2013  USD 1.107 mill 
- 2014 USD 1.039 mill 
- 2015 USD 121 mill 
Total  USD 2.267 mill 
5.6.2 Conversion 
I have assumed conversion of 3 old carriers to FLNG vessels. The conversion cost has been 
set to USD 100 mill per vessel, and conversion period to 2 years. These estimates are based 
upon the reported FSRU conversion costs for Golar Freeze + USD 10 mill. per vessel (Golar 
LNG, 2006). 
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6 Return 
6.1 Cost of capital 
The cost of capital reflects the perceived risk by investing in a company. The cost should be 
the same as for alternative investments, given the same risk applies. The cost of capital is the 
minimum return required by investors to choose one same- risk project over another. 
Incremental changes in the cost of capital can have significant impact on the company 
valuation so it is important to get the cost estimate as precise as possible. However, 
establishing the cost of capital, is “[..] Far from an exact science, more a mixture of theory 
and discretion”. (Dahl, Hansen, Hoff, & Kinserdal, 1997)  
My valuation model will be based on the estimated net cash flow to the firm, and it is 
therefore required to find a cost of capital for operations, sometimes also referred to as the 
weighted average cost of capital (WACC). Penman (2010) uses “Value of operations” as 
denominator, but for transparency I will use the sum of “Equity market value” and “Market 
value of debt”. 
WACC=    
  
     
    
  
     
        
Where, 
 ρE = Equity cost of capital 
ρD  = Debt cost of capital  
V
E
  = Equity market value 
V
D
 = Debt market value 
tc = Corporate tax rate 
 
6.2 Cost of equity 
A much used tool to find the cost of equity is the CAPM model as independently derived in 
the early 60’s by William F. Sharp, Jan Mossin and John Lintner (Bodie, Merton, & Cleeton, 
Financial Economics, second edition, 2009) 
R (i) =                       
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Where, 
 R (i) = Equity cost of capital for company (i) 
R (f)  = Risk free rate  
R (m)  = Market return 
β (i) = Beta value for company (i) 
Assumptions, 
1. Investors hold risky assets in the same relative proportions 
2. In equilibrium, prices adjust so demand equals supply for each security 
All companies listed on a stock exchange are subject to the same, common systemic forces/ 
risks (inflation, credit availability etc), which can be expressed as the co-variance between a 
stock and the market. CAPM denotes this risk as β. Company specific risks are diversified 
away (ref assumption 1). 
From the formula, three estimates are needed to calculate cost of equity capital: 
- Risk free rate 
- Market premium (R(m) – R(f)) 
- β 
 
6.2.1 Risk free rate 
It is broadly accepted to use government bonds to derive the risk free rate (Dahl, Hansen, 
Hoff, & Kinserdal, 1997) (Penman, 2010), most notably US bonds, with maturity date equal 
or close to the investment horizon. Given the recent turmoil in the bond market, it is clear 
however, that risk free government bonds may not necessarily be risk free after all. Even 
though also US credit rating has been downgraded by some rating agencies, the US 
government bonds are still backed by the credibility of the largest economy in the world, 
which can print its own currency and in effect cannot default on its debt. I will use US 30- 
year bonds as reference, as this has a maturity closest to the expected vessel useful life of 50 
years. 
The current US 30- year yield is 2,87%. 
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Figure 14 US bond yields as per 8 April, 2013 (Bloomberg, 2013). 
 
6.2.2 Market premium 
The market premium is the expected return from a diversified market portfolio with the 
subtraction of the risk free rate. To determine the expected market premium is not easy, and 
the opinions are split as to what level should be used. It all depends who you ask or what 
historical period (-s) one uses to measure market premium. Thoresen argues 3-5% is a good 
estimate. (Thoresen, 2006) A different interval as suggested by Sørensen, whilst arguing there 
is “no correct answer”, is to assume the premium to be between 4-6% (Sørensen, 2009). 
PricewaterHouseCoopers regularly conducts investor surveys to find the average understood 
market premium at the time. In 2013, they found it to be 5% for Oslo Stock Exchange (PWC, 
2012), where Golar LNG is OTC listed.  
In the following I will use 5% as the expected market premium. 
6.2.3 β- ‘Beta’ 
The ‘beta’ for the market as a whole is by definition 1. It is a measure of a security’s market-
related (systemic) risk, showing how much a security’s rate of return tends to change when 
the return on the market portfolio changes. (Bodie, Merton, & Cleeton, Financial Economics, 
second edition, 2009)  
If a company’s ‘beta’ is less than 1, it will be less volatile than the market, and contrary if it is 
larger than 1, it will be more volatile. To find the ‘beta’ of a stock, the price of the stock must 
be compared to a market index over a period of time. I have used the following formula to 
compare the share price against a market index on the last trading- day of the month for a 
period of 6 years. 
β = 
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Where, 
 R (i) = Equity cost of capital for company (i) 
R (m)  = Market return 
Finding the ‘beta’ value, I have chosen to use S&P 500 over NASDAQ as market reference 
even though Golar LNG is listed on NASDAQ. This due to the S&P is considered the “best 
single gauge of the large cap U.S. equities market since the index was first published in 1957. 
[..] The index includes 500 leading companies in leading industries of the U.S. economy, 
capturing 75% coverage of U.S. equities”. (Standardandpoors.com, 2013) 
6.2.4 Calculations 
‘Beta’ value (See Appendix for calculations) was calculated by finding the covariance 
between the S&P 500 index and Golar LNG over the last 6 years.  
Covariance 0,00529018 
Variance 0,00269895 
’Beta’ value 1,96009001 (For simplicity I will use 1,96 in my calculations.) 
 The estimated value seems to be in line with other sources, which have it at just above 1,90. 
(Reuters.com, 2013) 
Cost of equity 
R (i) =                       
R (i) = 2,87 + 5,00 x 1,96 = 12,67% 
6.3 Cost of capital (debt) 
A theoretical model will not be used for this measure. Instead it will be deducted from the 
financial statements and presentations issued by Golar LNG.  
As of 31 Dec 2012, the company’s debt was USD 505 mill, which includes current portion of 
interest bearing debt. The debt is split in vessel specific facilities, which all are at over and 
above LIBOR at a fixed or floating rate range from 0,70% to 0,95% and 0,70% to 3,50% 
respectively. 
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In my calculations, I will use the 2012 weighted average interest rate for all debt, which was 
at 3,97% (Golar Lng, 2013). 
6.4 WACC 
To calculate WACC, the market value of equity and - debt respectively must first be 
calculated. 
The stock quote as per market close 31 Dec 2012 was USD 36,78. 
There are 80.504.000 shares, so the market value of equity is USD 2.960.900.000,- 
The market value of debt is assumed to be equal to the sum of short term and long term debt 
as listed in the annual financial statement per 31 Dec 2012. Tax rate is 4%. 
 
WACC =    
  
     
    
  
     
        
WACC =       
          
                    
      
         
                   
          
WACC = 10,95% 
As previously discussed, estimating a cost for capital is far from an exact science. There is 
many assumptions and probably biased discretion involved as well in any such calculation. As 
Golar has two classes of vessels in operation, and a third class approaching introduction, it is 
also important to consider that the WACC for the three classes respectively will probably not 
be the same. On this background it will be important to do a thorough sensitivity analysis to 
assess the impact an adjusted WACC will have on the estimated fundamental value of the 
company. As mentioned in chapter 2.2, funding of new builds and growth plans are expected 
to be secured without issuing equity, so given that the estimated cost of debt is lower than the 
estimated cost of equity; the WACC maybe should be lower. It is also worth keeping in mind 
that we are seeing unprecedented measures being launched by the world’s central banks in the 
form of monetary stimulus, and it has yet to be seen what the final impact of these measures 
will be. Experts have split opinions on the subject. There are those that expect the interest 
levels to rise sharply at some point, whilst others argue the rates will stay low for a long time, 
as they have done in Japan over the last 25 years.  Any excessive change in rate levels will 
obviously impact the WACC and as a consequence the value of the company. As existing 
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charter contracts states monthly charter payments prior to every month, the cash flow per year 
will be discounted by a period of 0,4 and not 0,5 as would be normal with payments at month 
end throughout the year.  
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7 Cash Flow analysis 
7.1 Introduction 
As I have made many assumptions in previous chapters, I will start this chapter off with a 
quick summary of the framework for the Cash flow analysis. 
Main assumptions: 
- No fleet growth beyond existing new build program 
- Charter rates as in existing contracts, all options exercised 
- Charters for currently open positions at lower end of EBITDA estimates from Golar. 
FLNG charter rates assumed to slightly exceed FSRU charter rates. 
From 2027 and throughout, all rates are adjusted for 2% annual growth/- inflation 
- No gain or loss on traded vessels 
- Tax rate is 4% 
- Vessel useful life at 50 years 
- Maintenance USD 3 mill per year per vessel throughout useful life (adjusted for 
annual inflation of 2%). 
- Salvage value at nominal USD 6 mill per vessel. 
- Time in operation 95% for FSRUs/FLNGs, 90% for carriers on charter contract, 75% 
for 4 ea (at all times) carriers in spot- market. 
- No change in working capital 
7.2 Golar LNG partners vessels 
I will go through the cash flow calculation for one vessel group each of FSRUs and carriers 
respectively, and also the calculation of administrative costs. It is assumed that the cash flow 
to Golar LNG from GLMP equals its share of available cash from GLMP, which will be paid 
in full to the partners according to “first target distribution” in fig 1. The full calculation for 
all vessels is attached in the appendix section. 
7.2.1 FSRU vessels 
The Nusantara Regas Satu is 60% owned by Golar, and has 34 years remaining life. It is 
currently on a charter contributing an estimated USD 43 mill EBITDA to GLMP per year. 
Including options, the charter contract runs until year end 2025. 
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Figure 15 Calculation of contribution to cash flow from the FSRU vessel Nusantara Regas Satu. 
As long as the vessel is on the existing contract, the EBITDA from the charter is USD 43 mill 
per year, and in line with my assumptions, it drops to an annual USD 40 mill (+2% annual 
increase) for the remaining years of useful life. Time in operation is set to 95% throughout 
useful life. The utilization rate can be set this high as the ship will mainly be on long term 
contracts, thus causing less downtime due to waiting for cargo and time between contracts. It 
has also been set higher than the utilization rate for contracted carriers due to FSRUs will be 
moored, which will allow for easier maintenance during operation, as well as better 
accessibility to spares and specialist mechanics. The estimated 5% downtime includes 5- year 
class. The EBIT is found by multiplying EBITDA with time in operation and subtracting 
depreciation cost. Adding depreciation and deducting the estimated annual maintenance cost 
gives cash- flow to firm (USD 34,91 mill in 2013). As mentioned in chapter 6.4, the 
discounting period is 0,4 the first year, 1,4 the second year and so forth.  
The discounted CF to firm is calculated by the following formula: 
Discounted CF to firm = 
                   
                         
 
Having calculated the discounted CF to firm every year of remaining useful life, the total 
discounted CF is found by summing all the years. 
For this specific vessel, there is however a special consideration to make; as it is only 60% 
owned by the Golar group, the discounted CF must be multiplied by 0,6. 
The discounted CF from Nusantara Regas Satu to GLMP is thereby found to be USD 206,28 
mill. 
The same calculation is done for the 3 other FSRU’s, with the exception of correcting for 
ownership as they are 100% owned. 
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7.2.2 Carriers 
For carriers, the procedure is exactly the same, with the exception of the time in operation. 
The Methane Princess is 100% owned by Golar, and has 40 years remaining life. It is 
currently on a charter contributing an estimated USD 24 mill EBITDA to GLMP per year. 
Including options, the charter contract runs until year end 2025. 
 
Figure 16 Calculation of contribution to cash flow from the carrier vessel Methane Princess. 
As long as the vessel is on the existing contract, the EBITDA from the charter is USD 24 mill 
per year, and it subsequently increases to USD 40 mill (+2% annual increase) for the 
remaining years of useful life. Time in operation is set to 90% throughout useful life. The 
utilization rate can be set higher than for carriers sailing in the spot- market as the ship will 
mainly be on long term contracts, thus causing less downtime due to waiting for cargo and 
time between contracts. The estimated 10% downtime includes 5- year class. 
7.2.3 General company costs for GLMP 
These are costs not directly attributable to a specific charter contract, and as such, not 
accounted for in the estimated vessel generated cash flows. 
- Administrative expenses; has been stable over the last couple of years at approx USD 
5-6 mill. In the analysis, this cost is set at USD 6 mill for 2013, increasing by 2% per 
year to account for inflation, wage increases etc. 
- Investments/ depreciation; No such costs are assumed to be relevant, as they would be 
very small. 
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Figure 17 Discounted cash flow from administrative tasks at GLMP. Not vessel specific. 
The negative contribution to GLMP is USD 69,72 Mill. 
7.3 Golar LNG vessels 
I will go through the cash flow calculation for the new builds, and the FLNG conversion 
candidates as two consolidated entities. I will also show the calculation of administrative 
costs. I will not go through the calculation for the 3 new carriers Maria, Arctic and Viking, 
reason being they are conducted in the same manner as in chapter 7.2.2.  
7.3.1 New builds 
All new builds are at the time owned by Golar LNG. They will be launched in 2013, 2014 and 
2015. At the moment none of the vessels are contracted, but (as disclosed by management 
during presentation of Q4 2012 results) it is expected at least the 2 FSRU vessels will be by 
the time they are launched, as the company is in closing stages of contract negotiations 
(SeekingAlpha.com, 2013) Of the 11 carriers further 2 may be converted to FSRUs, but as the 
signals are not conclusive I have opted to treat them as carriers in my calculations. 
- 5 vessels launched in 2013 will be in operation for an average of 1 quarter in 2013. 
- 7 vessels launched in 2014 will be in operation for an average of 2 quarters in 2014. 
- 1 vessel launched in 2015 will be in operation 3 quarters in 2015. 
All vessels are assumed to have yearly EBITDA of USD 40 mill until 2026, from which point 
on the EBITDA is assumed to increase by 2% annually for the remaining useful life.  
Depreciation is as stated in chapter 5.2.6. 
Average time in operation is 86%. The low utilization rate is due to an estimated 4 carriers 
will be in the spot- market. The average time in operation takes into account the assumed 
utilization rates of 95-, 90- and 75% respectively.  
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Investments in 2013, 2014 and 2015 are payment of installments (Golar LNG, 2012) for new 
build deliveries, and from then on it is estimated an annual USD 3 mill (+2% annual increase) 
per vessel in maintenance costs. Note that as maintenance becomes relevant in 2016, the 
annual USD 3 mill per vessel has already been inflated since 2013. 
 
Figure 18 Calculation of contribution to cash flow from the 13 new build vessels 
EBITDA is lower in 2013-2015 and 2063-2064 due to some vessels are either not yet 
delivered or have been taken out of service. 
7.3.2 FLNG conversion candidates 
The 3 remaining old carriers in Golar’s fleet are targeted for FLNG conversion. In March 
2013 the management confirmed they are still on track to start the first conversion within 
2013. However they would not at this time disclose any business sensitive info, other than that 
there were great market interest in the vessels, and that they expected the project framework 
would not be entirely different from the FSRU segment. (SeekingAlpha.com, 2013) Another 
factor making the conversions very likely is that without the conversion and change of use, all 
3 vessels are very close to the end of their useful lives. Doing the conversions is expected to 
add another 10 years to each vessels life (Golar LNG Partners, 2012). As the company seems 
very optimistic regarding the FLNG market, I have used a slightly higher annual EBITDA per 
vessel at USD 45 mill. This number is not subject to annual inflation as the first contracts are 
also assumed to be the last. 
In 2013, prior to conversion, just one of the vessels will be in the spot market; at a rate 
equaling EBITDA USD 16 mill per year (These are 1
st
 generation ships, and therefore are not 
as attractive (ref fig 11). The 2 other vessels are in lay- up, with zero cost expected until 
commencement of conversion work. 
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Figure 19 Calculation of contribution to cash flow from the 3 FLNG convert vessels 
I estimate conversion work for 2 full years in 2014 and 2015, at a combined cost of USD 300 
mill, before all 3 vessels go into operation in 2016. As mentioned in chapter 4.2.3 it is 
expected to be a very tight liquefaction market going forward, so my estimated EBITDA 
contribution may very well be too low. Salvage value and depreciation is as previously stated. 
Note that the deferred tax benefit in 2013-2015 is not correctly accounted for, but as it is a 
matter of an amount just under USD 1 mill, I have ignored it. 
7.3.3 General company costs for GLNG 
These are costs not directly attributable to a specific charter contract, and as such, not 
accounted for in the estimated vessel generated cash flows. 
- Administrative expenses; these have been increasing over the last couple of years. 
This higher cost is much related to the new build- and project activity. In the analysis, 
the cost is set at USD 35 mill for 2013-2016, reduced to USD 22 mill for 2017, and 
after that increasing by 2% per year throughout to account for inflation, wage 
increases etc. The reason for reduction after 2016 is that by then the project activity 
should be lighter. 
- Investments/ depreciation; no such costs are assumed to be relevant, as they would be 
very small. 
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Figure 20 Discounted cash flow from administrative tasks at GLNG. Not vessel specific. 
The negative contribution to GLNG is USD 282,35 mill. 
7.4 Value of Golar LNG 
Summing the segment DCF values, gives the value prior to subtracting net debt to find value 
of equity. Value of equity is divided by number of shares to find share value. 
 
Figure 21 Calculation of Est. Share value for Golar LNG. 
The interest bearing debt and cash amount is found in the balance sheet (31.12.2012). 
55 
 
Regarding the vessel Golar Maria, that vessel has been sold to GLMP in 2013, but in my 
calculations it is treated as if it is still a GLNG owned vessel. This is done to avoid mixing up 
the numbers, and as the asset sale is done at fair value, it should not matter much in the 
valuation. 
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8 Sensitivity analysis and comparative evaluation 
8.1 Comparative evaluation 
To check if the value- estimation seems reasonable, it is common practice to compare 
multiples with other companies (peers) that are as similar in area of business, life cycle and 
size as possible. As mentioned, it is not that many shipping companies that are specialized in 
LNG transportation and publically traded, so there are not that many peers directly 
comparable. In my evaluation, I have chosen to use Hoegh LNG (HLNG) and Awilco LNG 
(ALNG). 
HLNG is similar to GLNG in terms of fleet composition. They are of late actively engaged in 
the FSRU segment as well as planning towards FLNG involvement in the future. However, 
their carriers are less exposed to spot rate fluctuations as they have higher contract coverage 
on their vessels. ALNG is a much smaller company, which is only engaged in carrier 
ownership and operation. As with GLNG, ALNG has currently little contract coverage for 
their carriers, and as such will be exposed to down- and upside risk in a similar fashion to 
GLNG. Multiples for peers are found on the web (Bloomberg, 2013) and multiples for GLNG 
are calculated by the formulas given in 3.1.2, net equity value in chapter 7.4 and numbers 
from the 2012 balance sheet. The multiples are based on ttm (trailing twelve month) and mrq 
(most recent quarter). 
The multiples are as follows: 
 
Figure 22 Price- ratio multiples for Golar LNG and peers (2012 accounting numbers). 
Looking at the multiples, it is obvious there are extraordinary reasons behind the variation in 
P/E ratio between the three companies. The reason behind HLNG’s very high PE I do not 
know, but I am assuming it is just a transitional phase in which costs have increased, and that 
the market is looking past it. This explanation is supported by the other multiples. For GLNG 
the P/E number has been inversely affected to that of HLNG; it is very low, due to the effects 
of deconsolidating GLMP, and the USD 853 mill “gain on loss of control”. To put the P/E 
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multiples in context, I have included the 2012 EPS, and I have chosen to ignore P/E as a 
multiple for comparison. 
Looking at the other multiples, they may go a long way to indicate that my value estimate of 
GLNG may be too optimistic. On the other hand, ALNG is a very small player, and their 
share price may well be subdued due to the fact they have little or none contract coverage, and 
they may even have problems financing their new build deliveries. HLNG offers little 
uncertainty (and upside) as their vessels are for the most part contracted on relative long 
charters. What may support the higher multiples for GLNG is that the fleet will double in size 
over the next 2-3 years, and that there is little uncertainty with regards to financing the 
remaining payable CAPEX installments for new builds.  
Traditionally, all companies controlled by John Fredriksen will offer attractive yield, which 
may also contribute to the stock trading on higher multiples. 
8.2 Sensitivity analysis 
The assumptions made in the valuation framework, and the numbers forming basis for the 
DCF calculations, are very decisive for the share value estimate. As there is a certain amount 
of uncertainty connected to most parameters, a sensitivity analysis is very important to shed 
some light on the effects to share value caused by changes in parameters. The results 
generated by this analysis will help in executing a qualified evaluation of the estimated share 
value. The measured parameters are the ones in which I have had to make assumptions, 
estimations and simplifications. The valuation exercise is repeated for a change in each 
unique parameter, 10% increase and 10% reduction respectively.  
The charted results of the sensitivity analysis measures the change in share value estimate, 
with the estimated share value of USD 40,39 as the reference point. 
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Figure 23 GLNG est. share value (USD) for 10% changes in parameters. 
From the above chart, it is obvious that the parameters to have the greatest impact on any 
share valuation estimate, is EBITDA and WACC. As these are also probably the parameters 
with the highest degree of uncertainty, it is fair to say my valuation model is robust in all 
aspects except EBITDA and WACC. 
What may cause the EBITDA to change significantly from my estimations are changes to 
charter rates and to some extent changes to operational costs. Given that the current interest- 
rate regime in the world will continue for some time, the WACC is more likely to be lower 
than what I have used. What may also contribute to a lower WACC, is that the cost of equity 
is higher than the cost of debt. As GLNG has stated they are not likely to finance remaining 
new build deliveries by issuing equity, but rather by increasing their debt, it is likely the 
company’s debt to equity ratio will raise, thereby potentially lower the WACC for GLNG. 
 
 
30 35 40 45 50 
WACC 
EBITDA 
Out of operation 
Maintenance 
Company general cost 
Inflation/ growth 
10% Increase in parameter 10% Reduction in parameter 
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9 Conclusion. 
My valuation of GLNG indicates the stock is currently undervalued by roughly 8-10% both 
compared to the 2012 year end share price USD 36,78, and even the share price as per 9
th
 
May 2013 of USD 37,20.  
As there is an amount of uncertainty with regards to LNG freight rate levels over the next 
couple of years, and most likely no short- term upside compared to my assumptions, I would 
recommend a “hold” strategy for the stock. However, looking at the prospectively bright 
future for LNG and LNG transportation, along with the dividend policy and mid-stream 
strategy communicated by GLNG management, I would recommend a “buy” strategy for 
investors with a long term investment- perspective.  The stock is also well off its highs (set in 
Q2 2012) and as such the downside potential may have already been taken out, unless charter 
rates deteriorate from here. 
What may cause the share price to increase is if favorable contracts for the new build vessels 
are announced, as that will remove much of the uncertainty for GLNG value estimates. 
From the comparative analysis there are indications investors are willing to pay a premium for 
LNG shippers that are actively engaged in FSRU/FLNG vessels. This is most likely due to the 
market is looking tighter for these vessels than for carriers, an assumption which is supported 
by current contract terms and lengths.  
Mid- stream players such as Hoegh and Golar, will offer less uncertain earnings than the likes 
of Awilco, which is only operating carriers. Thus it can be argued that mid- stream companies 
should trade at higher multiples than their down- stream peers- as they in fact currently are.  
When estimating the value of a company there will always be numerous uncertainties, as has 
been stated on several occasions during my valuation of Golar LNG. Some of the most 
influential weaknesses to my valuation approach has been highlighted in the sensitivity 
analysis, but the way the contribution from GLMP has been calculated is also not 100% 
correct. It can be argued that one would arrive at a more technically accurate estimate by 
calculating the dividend ratio payable to GLNG from GLMP as that would better capture the 
possible increased contribution from the IDR’s. However, as GLNG has relinquished legal 
control of GLMP, it is not at all certain that the board of directors at GLMP will pursue a 
growth strategy aimed at increasing GLNG’s share of available cash beyond its share of the 
partnership.  
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A perhaps unnecessary closing remark, is that my valuation estimate of Golar LNG must be 
viewed with caution, as my assumptions can be wrong, and factors that may affect the share 
value can change rapidly.  
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11 Appendix 
11.1 Beta calculation 
S&P 500 
    
Golar 
   
         
Date Price Change, price Change pct 
 
Date Price Change price Change Pct 
30.03.2007 1420,86 
   
30.03.2007 13,27 
  
30.04.2007 1482,37 61,50 0,04328603 
 
30.04.2007 15,94 2,68 0,2017729 
31.05.2007 1530,62 48,25 0,032551878 
 
31.05.2007 17,37 1,43 0,089461338 
29.06.2007 1503,35 -27,27 -0,01781797 
 
29.06.2007 16,28 -1,09 -0,06299548 
31.07.2007 1455,27 -48,07 -0,03197782 
 
31.07.2007 17,07 0,79 0,048619688 
31.08.2007 1473,99 18,71 0,012858832 
 
31.08.2007 18,68 1,61 0,094447635 
28.09.2007 1526,75 52,76 0,03579325 
 
28.09.2007 21,80 3,13 0,167363546 
31.10.2007 1549,38 22,63 0,014822752 
 
31.10.2007 25,40 3,60 0,164878053 
30.11.2007 1481,14 -68,23 -0,04403973 
 
30.11.2007 20,80 -4,60 -0,18115568 
31.12.2007 1468,36 -12,79 -0,00863386 
 
31.12.2007 21,61 0,81 0,038983768 
31.01.2008 1378,55 -89,81 -0,06116223 
 
31.01.2008 20,17 -1,44 -0,06645318 
29.02.2008 1330,63 -47,91 -0,03475713 
 
29.02.2008 18,65 -1,52 -0,07554577 
31.03.2008 1322,70 -7,93 -0,0059592 
 
31.03.2008 17,85 -0,80 -0,04295627 
30.04.2008 1385,59 62,88 0,047541327 
 
30.04.2008 19,60 1,75 0,097976815 
30.05.2008 1400,38 14,79 0,010674299 
 
30.05.2008 17,95 -1,65 -0,08424845 
30.06.2008 1280,00 -120,38 -0,08595934 
 
30.06.2008 15,13 -2,81 -0,15677763 
31.07.2008 1267,38 -12,62 -0,00985961 
 
31.07.2008 17,97 2,83 0,187222035 
29.08.2008 1282,83 15,45 0,012188173 
 
29.08.2008 15,67 -2,30 -0,12779009 
30.09.2008 1166,36 -116,47 -0,09078891 
 
30.09.2008 12,97 -2,70 -0,17206566 
31.10.2008 968,75 -197,61 -0,16942231 
 
31.10.2008 6,68 -6,29 -0,48493841 
28.11.2008 896,24 -72,52 -0,07485559 
 
28.11.2008 6,32 -0,36 -0,05409976 
31.12.2008 903,25 7,02 0,007830277 
 
31.12.2008 6,60 0,28 0,044821694 
30.01.2009 825,88 -77,37 -0,0856605 
 
30.01.2009 6,02 -0,59 -0,08875059 
27.02.2009 735,09 -90,79 -0,10993036 
 
27.02.2009 4,27 -1,75 -0,29058792 
31.03.2009 797,87 62,77 0,085396941 
 
31.03.2009 3,35 -0,92 -0,21510389 
30.04.2009 872,81 74,94 0,093925982 
 
30.04.2009 5,27 1,91 0,571415781 
29.05.2009 919,14 46,33 0,053084614 
 
29.05.2009 7,55 2,29 0,434146805 
30.06.2009 919,32 0,18 0,000195984 
 
30.06.2009 8,35 0,80 0,106084884 
31.07.2009 987,48 68,16 0,074141757 
 
31.07.2009 9,55 1,20 0,143859397 
31.08.2009 1020,62 33,14 0,033564869 
 
31.08.2009 9,72 0,17 0,017385024 
30.09.2009 1057,08 36,45 0,035717265 
 
30.09.2009 10,80 1,08 0,111550055 
30.10.2009 1036,19 -20,88 -0,01975636 
 
30.10.2009 11,78 0,98 0,090415194 
30.11.2009 1095,63 59,44 0,057358941 
 
30.11.2009 12,28 0,50 0,042295124 
31.12.2009 1115,10 19,47 0,017773455 
 
31.12.2009 12,52 0,24 0,019886317 
29.01.2010 1073,87 -41,23 -0,03697658 
 
29.01.2010 11,51 -1,01 -0,08083679 
26.02.2010 1104,49 30,62 0,028516831 
 
26.02.2010 11,00 -0,51 -0,04437263 
31.03.2010 1169,43 64,94 0,058794217 
 
31.03.2010 11,53 0,53 0,047905607 
30.04.2010 1186,69 17,26 0,014758292 
 
30.04.2010 12,80 1,27 0,110255209 
28.05.2010 1089,41 -97,28 -0,08197942 
 
28.05.2010 11,26 -1,54 -0,12008938 
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30.06.2010 1030,71 -58,70 -0,05387869 
 
30.06.2010 9,72 -1,54 -0,13648795 
30.07.2010 1101,60 70,89 0,068775178 
 
30.07.2010 10,62 0,90 0,092198217 
31.08.2010 1049,33 -52,27 -0,04745009 
 
31.08.2010 10,23 -0,39 -0,03710469 
30.09.2010 1141,20 91,87 0,087555879 
 
30.09.2010 12,52 2,29 0,224186483 
29.10.2010 1183,26 42,06 0,036852904 
 
29.10.2010 13,26 0,74 0,059105431 
30.11.2010 1180,55 -2,70 -0,00228585 
 
30.11.2010 13,91 0,65 0,049019608 
31.12.2010 1257,64 77,08 0,065293983 
 
31.12.2010 15,01 1,10 0,079079799 
31.01.2011 1286,12 28,48 0,022649578 
 
31.01.2011 17,45 2,44 0,162558294 
28.02.2011 1327,22 41,10 0,03195911 
 
28.02.2011 19,06 1,61 0,09226361 
31.03.2011 1325,83 -1,40 -0,00105293 
 
31.03.2011 25,58 6,52 0,34207765 
29.04.2011 1363,61 37,79 0,028499571 
 
29.04.2011 32,56 6,98 0,272869429 
31.05.2011 1345,20 -18,41 -0,01350448 
 
31.05.2011 31,86 -0,70 -0,02149877 
30.06.2011 1320,64 -24,56 -0,01825627 
 
30.06.2011 34,89 3,03 0,095103578 
29.07.2011 1292,28 -28,36 -0,02147161 
 
29.07.2011 38,13 3,24 0,092863285 
31.08.2011 1218,89 -73,39 -0,05679034 
 
31.08.2011 32,99 -5,14 -0,13480199 
30.09.2011 1131,42 -87,47 -0,07176448 
 
30.09.2011 31,78 -1,21 -0,03667778 
31.10.2011 1253,30 121,88 0,107719384 
 
31.10.2011 40,43 8,65 0,272183763 
30.11.2011 1246,96 -6,34 -0,00505563 
 
30.11.2011 43,60 3,17 0,078407123 
30.12.2011 1257,60 10,64 0,00853655 
 
30.12.2011 44,45 0,85 0,019495413 
31.01.2012 1312,41 54,80 0,043578708 
 
31.01.2012 41,00 -3,45 -0,0776153 
29.02.2012 1365,68 53,27 0,040591838 
 
29.02.2012 42,47 1,47 0,035853659 
30.03.2012 1408,47 42,79 0,031328759 
 
30.03.2012 38,05 -4,42 -0,10407346 
30.04.2012 1397,91 -10,56 -0,00749457 
 
30.04.2012 36,98 -1,07 -0,02812089 
31.05.2012 1310,33 -87,58 -0,06265272 
 
31.05.2012 35,03 -1,95 -0,05273121 
29.06.2012 1362,16 51,83 0,039554751 
 
29.06.2012 37,70 2,67 0,076220383 
31.07.2012 1379,32 17,17 0,012601447 
 
31.07.2012 38,66 0,96 0,025464191 
31.08.2012 1406,58 27,25 0,019757326 
 
31.08.2012 39,12 0,46 0,011898603 
28.09.2012 1440,67 34,10 0,024242445 
 
28.09.2012 38,59 -0,53 -0,01354806 
31.10.2012 1412,16 -28,52 -0,01979387 
 
31.10.2012 38,90 0,31 0,008033169 
30.11.2012 1416,18 4,02 0,002849254 
 
30.11.2012 39,08 0,18 0,004627249 
31.12.2012 1426,19 10,01 0,007065766 
 
31.12.2012 36,78 -2,30 -0,05885363 
31.01.2013 1498,11 71,92 0,050430202 
 
31.01.2013 41,05 4,27 0,116095704 
28.02.2013 1514,68 16,57 0,011058822 
 
28.02.2013 37,91 -3,14 -0,07649208 
28.03.2013 1569,19 54,51 0,035986259 
 
28.03.2013 36,99 -0,92 -0,024268 
         
Covariance. 
S&P and GLNG 0,005290176 
       
Variance S&P 0,002698945 
       
β Golar LNG 1,960090007 
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11.2 Balance sheet 
Assets 2012 2011 2010 
Current assets 
   Cash and - equivalents 424714 66913 164717 
Short term investments 1551 28012 21815 
Other receivables 11609 7830 12136 
Inventories 2051 3211 5664 
Total current assets 439925 105966 204332 
Long term assets 
   Restricted cash 0 185270 186041 
Investments in securities, affiliates etc 919214 29876 20276 
Newbuildings 435859 190100 0 
Vessels and equipment 573615 1203003 1103137 
Capital leases 0 501904 515666 
Other non current assets 45786 16515 48320 
Total assets 2414399 2232634 2077772 
    Liabilities & Equity 2012 2011 2010 
Current liabilities 
   Current portion of long term debt 14400 64306 95629 
Current portion of long term debt to related parties 0 0 10000 
Current portion of obligations under capital leases 0 5909 5766 
Accounts payable 10203 23124 16308 
Accrued expenses 20413 30642 22588 
Amounts due to related parties 4037 21178 438 
Other current liabilities 38006 110981 96427 
Total current liabilities 87059 256140 247156 
Long term liabilities 
   Long term debt 490506 627243 691549 
Long term debt due to related parties 0 80000 0 
Obligations under capital leases 0 399934 406109 
Other long term liabilities 72515 113497 133636 
Total liabilities 650080 1476814 1478450 
Equity 
   Share capital 80504 80237 67808 
Additional paid in capital 654042 398383 98005 
Contributed surplus 200000 200000 200000 
Accumulated other comprehensive loss 18730 34948 33311 
Retained earnings 848503 34093 78086 
Total stockholder equity 1764319 677765 410588 
Non controlling interests 0 78055 188734 
Total equity 1764319 755820 599322 
Total liabilities & equity 2414399 2232634 2077772 
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11.3 DCF calculations 
11.3.1 FLNG converts 
 
11.3.2 New builds 
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11.3.3 Carriers 
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11.3.4 FSRUs 
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11.3.5 Company costs 
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